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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The initial parties to this action included plaintiff John 
Wagner Associates, dba Grabber Utah, and defendants Hercules, 
Inc. and Modulaire Industries, Inc. Prior to trial, defendant 
Modulaire Industries Inc. and plaintiff John Wagner Associates, 
dba Grabber Utah settled their disputes. Defendant Modulaire 
Industries Inc. is therefore not a party to this appeal. 
(i) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in deciding 
that the mobile office units which Hercules leased from Modulaire 
should be regarded as realty as a matter of law, and that the 
leasing of the units is therefore within the scope of the Utah 
Contractors' Bond statute, Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 jet sea. 
(1986). 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in deciding 
that Hercules' use of the Navy's land and its lease of the mobile 
office units, when combined, constitute a real property interest 
which is sufficient to be attached under the Utah Mechanics' Lien 
statute, Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-1 et seg. (1974 and Supp. 1986). 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is published 
at 797 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1990). A copy of the Opinion, as 
filed, is attached as Addendum A. References in this Petition 
are to the attached Opinion. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(a) (1990). This appeal is from a decision 
by the Court of Appeals, dated August 31, 1990, with an order 
respecting a Petition for Rehearing entered November 26, 1990. 
The Court of Appeals originally awarded attorneys' fees to 
Wagner. However, in an unpublished Order on Rehearing, dated 
November 26, 1990, the Court amended its Opinion to delete the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
attorneys' fees award. A copy of the Order is attached as Adden-
dum B. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The two determinative statutory provisions are set 
forth in Addendum C. They are Utah's Mechanics' Lien statute, 
Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-1 et seg. (1986) and Utah's Contractors' 
Bond statute, Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 et. seg. (1974 and Supp. 
1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Petitioner Hercules, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Hercules") has an award/contract to produce missiles for the 
United States Navy at a plant located on land owned by the fed-
eral government and controlled by the Navy. (R. 234, Exhibit 2; 
R. 248-249; R. 640, p. 104). On June 7, 1985, Hercules gave a 
purchase order to Modulaire Industries Inc. (hereinafter 
"Modulaire") under which Modulaire agreed to lease mobile office 
units for Hercules' use for a period of 24 months. (R. 640, p. 
53 Exhibit 64). Modulaire transported thirty modular units mea-
suring 14 feet by 60 feet to the plant site and assembled the 
units together to form the shells of the two office units. (R. 
640, p. 69-70, Exhibit 71). 
Because the interiors of the mobile office units were 
unfinished, Modulaire contracted with Space Building Systems 
(hereinafter "SBS") to perform the interior finishing of the 
units using demountable partitioning. (R. 640, p. 75-76; R. 170, 
Exhibit 4). SBS subcontracted with plaintiff-respondent John 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Wagner Associates, dba Grabber Utah (hereinafter "Wagner") for 
materials used in completing the interiors of the units. (R. 
443). Hercules never contracted with SBS or with Wagner to per-
form any work on the units. (R. 640 p. 105-106). 
Modulaire paid SBS in full all sums due and owing for 
the work performed on the interiors of the trailers, but SBS 
filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code before paying Wagner under the subcontract. (R. 171; R. 640 
p. 12; R. 443). Wagner made demand for payment from Modulaire 
and Hercules, and upon their refusal to make payment for the 
materials, filed a notice of lien against an alleged interest s>l 
Hercules in the Navy's property with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-1 et sea, (hereinaf-
ter the "Mechanics' Lien statute"), and subsequently filed this 
action to foreclose on the lien. (R. 443). A cause of action 
was also asserted against Hercules for failure to obtain a pay-
ment bond pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 et sea. (1986) 
(hereinafter the "Payment Bond statute"). (R. 640, p.9). 
The parties submitted various motions for summary judg-
ment and memoranda in support thereof. On March 22, 1988, Judge 
Noel of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, granted Hercules' Renewed Motion for Summary Judg-
ment with respect to Wagner's First Claim for Relief for mechan-
ic's lien foreclosure, finding that Hercules' interest in the 
Navy's property was not alienable and that Hercules had no inter-
est in the Navy's property sufficient to allow attachment under 
the Utah Mechanics' Lien statute, Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-1 et sect. 
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(R. 509-512). In the same order Judge Noel denied Hercules' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Hercules1 Renewed Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment concerning the Second Claim for Relief for failure 
to obtain a payment bond. (R. 509-512). 
Prior to trial, Wagner and Modulaire entered into a 
Stipulation of Dismissal and an Order of Dismissal, settling all 
causes of action between them. (R. 619-621). 
Trial took place on July 12, 1988. The only cause of 
action remaining at trial was against Hercules for failure to 
obtain a payment bond pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 et sea. 
(R. 640, p. 9). At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court 
found that Wagner had no cause of action against Hercules under 
Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 (1986). (R. 630-631). The trial court 
determined that the placing of these mobile office units leased 
from Modulaire on the Navy's land by Hercules did not constitute 
the construction, addition to, alteration or repair of a build-
ing, structure or improvement upon land as required by Payment 
Bond statute. (R. 628). 
The trial court also determined that Hercules, by vir-
tue of its placing these leased mobile office units on the Navy's 
land, was not subject to the provisions of S 14-2-1 (1986) and 
that Hercules therefore had no obligation to obtain a bond for 
the benefit of Wagner. (R. 628). Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law were entered by the trial court on August 24, 1988. 
(R. 623-629). 
The Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of law, the 
mobile office units constitute realty for purposes of the Payment 
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Bond statute and that the leasing of the units is within the 
scope of the statute. The Court reversed and remanded the Dis-
trict Court's Judgment with instructions to find for Wagner on 
that issue. Opinion at p. 18. The Court of Appeals also con-
cluded that the alienability of an owner's property interest is 
not a precondition to the attachment of a mechanic's lien and it 
reversed the District Court's Order granting summary judgment to 
Hercules on this issue. Wagner's foreclosure action was thus 
reinstated and remanded. Opinion at p. 18. 
ARGUMENT 
A Writ of Certiorari is appropriate when the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of state law in a way that is in 
conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court. Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, R. 46(b). The decision of the Court of 
Appeals in this case conflicts with this Court's decision in Paul 
Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 
1982). A Writ of Certiorari is also appropriate when the Court 
of Appeals has decided an important question of state law which 
has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court. Id., 
R. 46(d). This case presents a question as to whether a contract 
for the construction of missiles which is not alienable can be 
construed as a property interest which could be subject to 
attachment of a mechanic's lien. The Opinion of the Court of 
Appeals misapprehends the Payment Bond statute, the Mechanic's 
Lien statute, and the cases cited interpreting these statutes. 
This Court, therefore, should grant a Writ of Certiorari 
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reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstating 
the District Court's Order and its Judgment. 
I." THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION THAT THE LEASED MOBILE 
OFFICE UNITS CONSTITUTE REAL RATHER THAN PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY CONFLICTS WITH A DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT. 
? The Court of Appeals correctly acknowledges "the gen-
eral principle that the modular buildings must be regarded as 
realty before the Payment Bond Statute will apply." Opinion at 
p. 8 (emphasis added). This Court has articulated a test for the 
express purpose of determining whether property is real or per-
sonal. See Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Diary Ass'n, 657 
P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982). Nevertheless, in the present casef the 
Court of Appeals refused to apply the test set forth in Mueller, 
disregarded the factual findings of the trial courtf and con-
cluded on its own that the mobile office units constitute realty 
for purposes of both the Payment Bond and Mechanics' Lien 
statutes. 
Utah's Mechanics' Lien and Payment Bond statutes are 
similar in nature, similar in language and identical in purpose. 
The Mechanics' Lien statute provides that persons furnishing 
materials used in the construction or improvement of any build-
ing, structure, or improvement to any premises shall have a lien 
on the property for which they furnish materials. A lien granted 
under this statute can only attach to such interest as the owner 
may have in the property. Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-3 ejt sea. (1974 
and Supp. 1986). Similarly, the Payment Bond statute provides 
that the owner of any interest in land entering into a contract 
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for the construction or improvement of any building, structure or 
improvement upon land shall obtain from the contractor a bond 
conditioned for the faithful performance of the contract and 
prompt payment for materials furnished and labor performed under 
the contract. Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 et seg. (1986). 
The statutes are read ^n pari materia and are applied 
equally and consistently to the same fact situation. The simi-
larity between the Mechanics' Lien statute and the Payment Bond 
statute was noted long ago by the Utah Supreme Court in Rio 
Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke. 50 Utah 114, 167 P.241 (1917), in 
which the court upheld the constitutionality of Utah's Bond stat-
ute. Id. at 128, 167 P. at 246. Both of these statutes apply to 
(1) owners of an interest in land (2) for construction, addi-
tions, alterations, or repairs to any building, structure, or 
improvement on the land. In Rio Grande Lumber Co.. the Supreme 
Court noted that the Utah Bond statute "is auxiliary to our 
mechanic's lien law, and just as much in aid of it as if it had 
been made a part of it and incorporated in the same chapter." 
id. at 124, 167 P. at 245. 
Materials become an integrated part of real property 
only when annexed to the land or made a part of some permanent 
structure on the land. Mueller, 657 P.2d at 1283; Stanton Trans-
portation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 190, 341 P.2d 207, 211 
(1959); Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin. 31 Utah 241, 87 p.713 
(1906). In Mueller, supra, this Court established a tripartite 
test to be used in distinguishing between real and personal prop-
erty for the purpose of establishing whether a conversion from 
-7-
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personal to real property has occurred. The three factors artic-
ulated by the Court are: (1) The manner in which the item is 
annexed to realty; (2) Whether the item is adaptable to the par-
ticular use of the realty; and (3) The intention of the annexor 
to make an item a permanent part of the realty. It is apparent 
that the Mueller test is fact specific. 
The Mueller Court determined that an item is "adapt-
able" to the particular use of the realty when it is integrated 
into real property to further a specific purpose for which the 
real property has been devoted. 657 P.2d at 1283-84. The court 
stated, however, that personal property located on real property 
that is adaptable to multiple uses does not become "adapted" sim-
ply because the presence of the personal property determines the 
use of the real property at a particular time. 657 P.2d at 1284. 
In the instant case, the property was vacant and highly adaptable 
to multiple uses. (R. 640, p.120-121). Placing these trailers 
on the property did nothing to further any specific purpose for 
which the property could be devoted. The trailers are used as 
temporary offices and do not have any special integration with 
the real property. (R. 640, p.54, 106-107). The adaptation 
prong of the Mueller test has therefore not been met. 
Another important prong of the Mueller test is whether 
the parties intended the property to be personal property or real 
property. 657 P.2d at 1284. In this case, the "intention" of 
the parties to retain the personal property characteristics of 
the units is strongly supported by the transaction documents. 
The written quote from Modulaire to Hercules was for mobile 
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office units, specifying both setup and dismantling charges. (R. 
218, R 640, p.53). In addition, each trailer is required to have 
a Manufacturer's Statement of Origin and to have a Motor Vehicle 
License under Utah law. (R. 640, p.82-87, Exhibits 118-122, 
127-128). Since each trailer is classified as a motor vehicle by 
the Department of Motor Vehicles, each unit is issued a license 
plate and a certificate of title, and is thereafter taxed as per-
sonal property. Id. 
Therefore, the annexation, the adaptation and the 
intention prongs of the Mueller test have not been met and the 
property must be regarded as personalty rather than realty. 
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the 
Utah Supreme Court did not limit the applicability of the Mueller 
test to the issue of whether equipment had become an improvement 
upon the land. Opinion at p. 8. The Court of Appeals attempts 
1
 Valuable insight also is obtained from the tax provisions of 
Utah law. Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-601(1) (Supp. 1987), defines the 
trailers as mobile homes, since they are inter alia transportable 
in one or more sections with the plumbing, heating, and electri-
cal systems contained within the structure and used for commer-
cial purposes when erected on-site on a foundation. The tax pro-
visions further provide that a mobile home is permanently affixed 
when anchored to, and supported by, a permanent foundation. Utah 
Code Ann. S 59-2-601(2) (Supp. 1987). Mobile homes are taxed as 
real property if (1) the mobile home is permanently affixed; (2) 
the owner of the mobile home and the real property to which the 
mobile home is affixed files an affidavit of affixture; and (3) 
the certificate of title or manufacturer's certificate of origin 
of the mobile home is surrendered. Utah Code Ann. 
SS 59-2-602(1) - (3) and 59-2-603 (Supp. 1987). Liens against a 
mobile home that has been converted to real property must then be 
perfected in the manner provided for liens on real property. 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-602(5) (Supp. 1987). The trailers in the 
instant case, however, are still vehicles or mobile homes. They 
were not converted to real property by the process set forth by 
statute. 
-9-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to distinguish Mueller from the present case on the grounds that 
the subject property in Mueller is dairy equipment, whereas the 
subject property in this case is a "building," which, by fiat of 
the Court of Appeals, is realty. Such a distinction begs the 
question. Moreover, it ignores the test designed to make the 
determination of whether property is real or personal. The 
Mueller test applies where, as here, the issue is whether the 
subject property is personal or real. The Court of Appeals erred 
in side stepping the Mueller test, in not applying it to the 
facts of this case, and in legislating that mobile trailers are 
per se realty. _ 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals cites Waldorf v. 
Elliot, 214 Or. 437, 330 P.2d 355 (1958), in support of its argu-
ment that the units in question were "buildings" and therefore 
realty. Opinion, at p. 9. However, the Waldorf court actually 
used the same tripartite test set forth in Mueller to determine 
2 
whether the property in question was realty or personalty. In 
2
 The Waldorf decision indicates that the most important ele-
ment in the tripartite test was the intent of the parties. It 
stated: "The tendency found in modern decisions is to stress the 
third test — that of intention — making it controlling where 
there is doubt as to the effect of the two others [annexation and 
adaptation]." 330 P.2d at 357. As the trial court found, the 
intention of Hercules and Modulaire was clearly to have these 
mobile office units remain personalty because they anticipated 
that Modulaire would someday remove them from the property, as it 
had done with other trailers leased to Hercules. Some of these 
trailers previously removed from Hercules ended up at Word Per-
fect's property in Provo. (R. 640, p. 115). Hercules cannot 
understand why the Court of Appeals believes it should have to 
satisfy a Bond claim where the benefit of the work may be enjoyed 
by future lessees of the trailers. 
The intention that the trailers remain personalty is also 
evidenced by the fact that Modulaire's written quote to Hercules 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Waldorf, the issue was whether certain grain tanks located on 
property being sold to Mr. and Mrs. Waldorf were personal prop-
erty and not part of the sale, or whether the grain tanks were 
real property and included in the sale. Even though the court 
considered the tanks to be "buildings," that determination did 
not conclusively indicate the buildings were realty. The court 
said that determination simply shifted the burden of proof to the 
party claiming the property was personalty to show that it 
retained that character. 330 P.2d at 357. Hercules has met that 
burden of proof; the evidence adduced at trial established 
clearly that the mobile office units are personalty. 
As both Mueller and Waldorf show, whether property is 
real or personnel is a fact specific issue. The trial court 
denied Hercules' Motion for Summary Judgment and Renewed Motion 
for Summary Judgment concerning Wagner's Claim for Relief under 
the Payment Bond Statute precisely because it found the existence 
of factual issues relating to the trailers and whether they could 
truly be considered improvements to the Navy's land. See Order 
of the District Court, point 3, attached as Addendum D. In so 
ruling, the trial court correctly apprehended that whether the 
mobile office units constitute realty or personalty is a thresh-
old issue of fact which must be determined before the court can 
decide whether the Payment Bond statute applies. On this 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
for the mobile office unit complex included both setup and dis-
mantling charges. (R. 218). Based upon this intention, the 
mobile office units remained personalty and therefore were out-
side the scope of the Payment Bond and Mechanics' Lien statutes. 
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important fact question, the trial judge listened to the testi-
mony, viewed the evidence, and reached his decision. The Court 
of Appeals, downplaying and ignoring the work of trial court, 
ruled that the issue was one of law, not fact. Opinion at p. 6. 
In so deciding, however, the Court of Appeals erred because it 
ignored the rule of law this court established in Mueller. 
The error the Court of Appeals made regarding the def-
erence owed to the trial court lead directly to the erroneous 
conclusion that the leasing arrangement between Hercules and 
Modulaire was a contract within the scope of the Payment Bond 
Statute. Opinion at p. 6-7 n. 4. This conclusion is erroneous 
and overreaching. SBS, not Hercules, contracted for the con-
struction of the mobile office units. Hercules was not a party 
to that contract nor did it negotiate that contract with Wagner. 
Wagner was a subcontractor of SBS, SBS was a subcontractor of 
Modulaire, and Modulaire was the lessor of the units. The con-
tract between SBS and Wagner involved Hercules only to the extent 
that Hercules would someday lease the mobile office units for 
which Wagner was providing materials. Hercules, therefore, did 
not contract with Wagner for the construction of the units, as 
3 
required by the Payment Bond statue. 
3
 The use the Court of Appeals makes of the stipulation at 
trial as to the contractual chain as a basis for its conclusions 
of law is somewhat incredible in light of the fact that parties 
frequently stipulate at trial as to contractual chain to elimi-
nate the need for extensive evidence. The mere fact that 
Hercules stipulated that it was in a contractual chain certainly 
was not meant to demonstrate that it was part of a construction 
project. Hercules has always maintained that it is nothing more 
than a lessee of mobile trailers. 
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The trial court's finding that the mobile office units 
were never made part of the Navy's land is not clearly erroneous. 
The standard for review of the trial court's Findings of Fact is 
set forth in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). It provides, in 
pertinent part: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility the 
witnesses. . . . 
This Court has recently upheld this standard in Butler v. Leet 
108 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). See also State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-193 (Utah 1987). In Walker, the 
Utah Supreme Court quoted Wright & Miller in defining that 
standard: 
The appellate court. . . does not consider 
and weigh the evidence de novo. The mere 
fact that on the same evidence the appellate 
court might have reached a different result 
does not justify it in setting the findings 
aside. It may regard a finding as clearly 
erroneous only if the finding is without ade-
quate evidentiary support or induced by an 
erroneous view of the law. 
Id. at 193 (citing Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, 
S 2585 (1971)). Thus, under the "clearly erroneous" standard of 
Rule 52(a), this Court will uphold the Findings of Fact entered 
by the trial court unless this Court determines that the findings 
are against the clear weight of the evidence, or unless this 
Court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made. Walker, 743 P.2d at 193. 
In its effort to reach the conclusion that the mobile 
office units are realty, the Court of Appeals not only abandons 
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the guidance provided by this Court, but leaves logic and common 
sense behind as well. The Court states: 
Although the modular buildings may con-
stitute personal property as between Hercules 
and the Navy because they have not been per-
manently anchored to the land, and although 
the lease agreement may have caused the 
buildings to retain their personal property 
status as between Hercules and Modulaire, as 
between Hercules and its materialman, Wagner, 
we regard the buildings to be real property. 
Opinion at p. 13 (emphasis added). Petitioner is aware of no 
authority or rational basis for the proposition that property may 
be considered both real and personal simultaneously. In so 
deciding, the Court of Appeals has simply pronounced its desired 
outcome without supporting it with sound legal analysis. 
II. HERCULES IS NOT SUBJECT TO UTAH'S MECHANICS' 
LIEN STATUTE BECAUSE IT HAS NO ALIENABLE 
INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY ON WHICH THE COURT 
COULD FORECLOSE TO SATISFY WAGNER'S LIEN.4 
The purpose of Utah's Mechanics' Lien statute is to 
prevent the owners of land from having their lands improved 
i 
* Because the materials supplied by Wagner were never con-
verted to realty under the Mueller test, the Mechanics' Lien 
statute does not apply. As discussed above, the trial court 
found, as a matter of fact, that the mobile office units were not 
realty for purposes of the Payment Bond statute. However, the 
Mueller test applies directly to the issue of whether property is < 
realty or personalty for purposes of the Mechanics' Lien statute. 
Mueller, 657 P.2d at 1283. Therefore, reinstating the trial 
court's judgment and giving deference to its findings of fact, as 
this Court should, necessarily removes this case from the scope 
of the Mechanics' Lien statute as well. It is true that such a 
result leaves this plaintiff without a remedy, but fashioning < 
such a remedy is the province of the state legislature, not of 
the courts. 
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without having to pay the reasonable value for the materials and 
labor provided. Crane Co. v. Utah Motor Park, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 
413, 416, 335 P.2d 837, 839 (1959); Rio Grande Lumber Co., 50 
Utah at 127, 167 P. at 246. A mechanic's lien is a judicial 
mechanism to obtain for suppliers of goods or services payment 
for their labors and wares. When a lien is claimed on property, 
Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-15 provides that "[t]he court shall cause 
the property to be sold in satisfaction of the liens and costs as 
in the case of foreclosure of mortgages. . . ." The issue, 
therefore, is whether the Mechanics' Lien statute applies when 
the party defendant owns no alienable interest in the property in 
dispute. 
The land on which the mobile office units are located 
is owned by the United States Government and is under the juris-
diction of the Navy. (R. 234, Exhibit 2; R. 248-249; R. 640, p. 
104). However, the United States Navy did not contract for the 
lease, placement, or finishing of the units. The government is 
not a party to the contract involved in this action, and Hercules 
is not acting on behalf of the United States. Furthermore, the 
mobile office units for which Wagner supplied materials are nei-
ther public buildings nor public works within the scope of the 
Miller Act and therefore the Navy's land cannot be the subject of 
a lien and a subsequent sheriff's sale, or judicial sale. 
5
 In a related case, United States For The Use Of Idaho West-
ern, Inc. v. Modulaire Manufacturing and Hercules, Inc., filed in 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Cen-
tral Division, the plaintiff was a party in the same position as 
Wagner, having contracted with SBS to supply materials for the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Hercules uses the land without any lease, but pursuant 
to an award/contract. (R. 639, p. 31). Hercules is allowed to 
use the land only for so long as it uses the land for work on 
government contracts, id. Hercules is not the owner of the land 
and it has no interest to which a mechanic's lien could attach. 
Nor does it have an interest which could possibly be sold at a 
sheriff's sale or other judicial sale. 
It is clear from Utah law that Hercules' interest can 
in no way be considered a lease. Four factors must exist for a 
valid lease: (1) A binding contract in compliance with the stat-
ute of fraud; (2) Possession by the tenant; (3) Legal title in 
the landlord; and (4) A leasehold that is capable of being 
granted. Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Vol. II at 565-66 
(1978). Here, the second factor, possession by the tenant, has 
not been satisfied. Hercules is using the Navy's land pursuant 
to its award/contract, and has the right to use the land only so 
long as it uses it to work on government contracts. Hercules 
does not have legal possession of the land, which is necessary 
for a valid lease to exist. "The concept of where legal title 
remains is important in distinguishing a lease from other legal 
relationships. Likewise it is important in determining who has 
possession rights. For example, the landlord/tenant relationship 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
same mobile office units, and having not been paid. In that 
case, Judge Bruce S. Jenkins dismissed the action with prejudice 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
since the plaintiff's claim was barred by the Miller Act, 40 
U.S.C. S 270(a) et sea. 
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is distinguished from the licensor-licensee relationship in that 
the licensee never gains exclusive possession of the land; he 
receives only permission to use it." Id. at 565, note 2. Her-
cules' Use Agreement is just that, a use agreement, and Hercules 
clearly does not have "exclusive possession of the land." 
The district court correctly found that Hercules' 
interest in the land is not alienable and that it is not suffi-
cient to be attached under the Utah Mechanics' Lien statutes, 
Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-1, et sea. 
The Court of Appeals argues that the District Court's 
ruling would contravene the purpose of the Mechanics' Lien and 
Payment Bond statutes and would encourage owners of property to 
structure their dealings in such a way as to avoid the applica-
bility of the statutes. Opinion at p. 15. However, the possi-
bility of any such conduct occurring in the business world is 
remote at best. First, making missiles for the United States 
government is an infrequent, even rare, business enterprise. 
Second, few of the companies making missiles for the United 
States government likely operate on government land. Third, of 
those missile-making companies operating on United States govern-
ment land, very few likely operate in mobile office units. 
Finally, even fewer of those companies are likely to have situa-
tions involving subcontractors who do not get paid for their work 
by a bankrupt contractor and thus attempt to assert a mechanic's 
lien on the property. The argument is without merit. 
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The Court of Appeals' solution to the fact that 
Hercules owns no alienable interest in real property benefited by 
Wagner is unworkable and illogical. The Court states: 
Hercules has two separate and distinct prop-
erty interests: (1) an equitable interest in 
the Navy's land pursuant to the 
award/contract; and (2) an equitable interest 
in the buildings pursuant to a leasing 
arrangement with Modulaire. When combined, 
these two component interests constitute the 
property that was benefited by Wagner's mate-
rials. Wagner's lien attached to this cumu-
lative property interest. We believe that in 
order to give full effect to the Mechanic's 
Lien Statute, Wagner may pursue the sale of 
the component property interests separately. 
Opinion at p. 16-17 (emphasis added). However, the Court of 
Appeals fails to reveal the alchemy by which a court may combine 
two unrelated property interests, neither of which is individu-
ally capable of supporting a lien, creating therefrom a cumula-
tive property interest which is capable of having a lien attached 
to it, and then selling off the component interests separately. 
The Court of Appeals' solution is without any theoreti-
cal or practical value. First, as discussed above, Hercules has 
no interest in the Navy's land which could possibly be sold at a 
sheriff's sale or other judicial sale. Second, as determined by 
the trial court, the mobile office units leased from Modulaire 
were not annexed to the land, and thus the requirement that the 
units be real property is not met. Therefore, the notion that 
these interests, when combined, constitute an interest that can 
support a lien is nonsense. The doctrine espoused by the Court 
of Appeals would allow courts to create something out of nothing. 
Such a doctrine ignores a basic tenant of our system that we live 
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and conduct our business by rule of law promulgated by a legisla-
ture, not by rule of a few persons to whom the legislative power 
was not entrusted. 
Furthermore, the solution of the Court of Appeals' is 
unworkable as a practical matter. There is no satisfactory way 
to structure such a sale. Since the award/contract with the Navy 
entitles Hercules to use the Navy's land only for so long as 
Hercules is manufacturing missiles for the Navy, a foreclosure 
sale would terminate Hercules' right immediately and the pur-
chaser would acquire nothing. In sum, the Court of Appeals' 
solution is an illogical theory with no application in the real 
world. 
CONCLUSION 
The Modulaire trailers leased to Hercules were personal 
property and did not become part of the Navy's land by virtue of 
the fact that Hercules leased them from Modulaire. Therefore, 
this Court should affirm the trial court's conclusion that the 
placing of these leased mobile office units on the Navy's land by 
Hercules pursuant to its lease with Modulaire did not constitute 
the construction, addition to, alteration or repair of a 
6
 In light of the practical impossibility of implementing the 
Opinion of the Court of Appeals, it is ironic that the court 
quotes the Utah Supreme Court in Stanton Trans. Co. v. Davis, 
"When uncertainty exists as to the interpretation and application 
of a statute, it is appropriate to look to its purpose in light 
of its background and history, and also to the effect it will 
have in practical application." 9 Utah 2d 184, 187, 341 P.2d 
207, 209 (1959), quoted in Opinion at p. 5 (emphasis added). The 
opinion of the Court of Appeals provides no solution which is 
workable or enforceable. 
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building, structure, or improvement upon land as required by 
Utah's Contractors' Bond statute, Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Ann. 
(1986), and that it did not place Hercules within the class of 
persons subject to the provisions of Section 14-2-1. And this 
Court should affirm the trial court's Judgment dismissing with 
prejudice Wagner's Complaint. 
Hercules has no interest in the land to which a mechan-
ic's lien would attach. Consequently, there is in this case no 
remedy under the Mechanics' Lien statute because there is no 
interest in the land which could possibly be sold at a sheriff's 
sale or other judicial sale. This Court should therefore affirm 
the District Court's finding that Hercules' interest in the land 
is not alienable and that it is not sufficient to be attached 
under Utah's Mechanics' Lien statute, Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-1, et 
sea., and this Court should affirm the District Court's Order 
dismissing with prejudice Wagner's First Claim for Relief in its 
Complaint. 
DATED this 2C^ day of December, 1990. 
^ ^J&MES M."ELEGANTE 
MARK S. WEBBER 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Hercules, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM A 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS , AUfi/311990 
00O00 7 ' A*v :^mu 
John Wagner Associates, d/b/a 
Grabber Utah, 
P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, 
v . 
Hercules, Inc., Modulaire 
Industries, Inc., and John Does 
i-x, 
Defendants and Appellee. 
» ; * . Mi. , « . . r • *%•?•..* 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890017-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Attorneys: Darrel J. Bostwick and Robert F. Babcock, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
James M. Elegante and Mark S. Webber, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Davidson, and Orme. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff, John Wagner Associates, d/b/a Grabber Utah 
(Wagner), appeals the dismissal of its complaint against 
defendant Hercules, Inc. (Hercules). Wagner sought to recover 
compensation for construction materials supplied by Wagner for 
two modular buildings constructed on behalf of Hercules. We 
reverse and remand. 
Hercules has an award/contract to build missiles for the 
United States Navy at its Bacchus Works plant. The plant is 
located on land owned by the federal government and controlled 
by the Navy. In order to obtain additional office facilities 
at the site, Hercules leased two modular office complexes from 
Modulaire Industries, Inc. (Modulaire). The lease, which was 
entered into in June 1985 for a term of two years, included an 
option to renew and an option to buy. Modulaire transported 
thirty modular units measuring fourteen feet by sixty feet to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the plant site and assembled the units together to form the 
shells of two sizable buildings. 
Modulaire subcontracted with Space Building Systems (SBS) 
to provide labor and materials to finish the 25,000 square feet 
of office space inside the buildings. Wagner supplied drywall 
and other construction materials to SBS for the interior 
finishing. After the interior work was completed, SBS owed 
Wagner a balance of $14,300.03 for supplies and materials. 
Before Wagner was able to collect the outstanding balance, 
however, SBS filed for bankruptcy. Demand by Wagner for 
payment from Modulaire and Hercules was unsuccessful. 
Wagner filed a notice of mechanic's lien against the 
property with the Salt Lake County Recorder, pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 et. seq. (1988) 
(hereafter, the Mechanic's Lien Statute), and subsequently 
filed this action to foreclose on the lien. A cause of action 
was also asserted against Hercules for failure to obtain a 
payment bond as required by Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 et. seq. 
(1986) (hereafter, the Payment Bond Statute).1 
The trial court dismissed Wagner's foreclosure action on 
summary judgment, ruling that no mechanic's lien was available 
because Hercules's interest in the land was inalienable. The 
payment bond cause of action went to trial. Following a bench 
trial on the payment bond claim, the trial court found in favor 
of Hercules on the ground that Hercules's leasing of the office 
units did not "constitute the construction, addition to, 
alteration or repair of a building, structure, or improvement 
upon the land." 
Wagner appeals, seeking reversal of the summary judgment 
and reinstatement of its foreclosure action. Wagner also seeks 
reversal of the final judgment on its payment bond cause of 
action and remand to the trial court for determination of 
damages under the Payment Bond Statute. 
We are asked to interpret two similar statutes: (1) the 
Payment Bond Statute which requires an owner to obtain from the 
contractor a payment bond prior to the construction of a 
1. A third cause of action was asserted against Modulaire for 
breach of an agreement to issue joint checks payable to both 
SBS and Wagner. Wagner and Modulaire, however, settled prior 
to trial and Modulaire is not a party to this appeal. 
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building in order to guarantee that materialmen and laborers 
will be paid;2 and (2) the Mechanic's Lien Statute which 
2. The Payment Bond Statute provides in relevant part: 
14-2-1 Bond to protect mechanics and 
materialmen. 
The owner of any interest in land 
entering into a contract, involving $2,000 
or more, for the construction, addition to, 
alteration, or repair of any building, 
structure, or improvement upon land shall, 
before any such work is commenced, obtain 
from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to 
the contract price, with good and sufficient 
sureties, conditioned for the faithful 
performance of the contract and prompt 
payment for material furnished, equipment 
and materials rented, and labor performed 
under the contract. This bond runs to the 
owner and to all other persons as their 
interest may appear. Any person who has 
furnished or rented any equipment or 
materials, or performed labor for or upon 
any such building, structure, or 
improvement, for which payment has not been 
made, has a direct right of action against 
the sureties upon such bond for the 
reasonable value of the rented materials or 
equipment furnished, for the reasonable 
value of the materials furnished, or for 
labor performed, not exceeding the prices 
agreed upon. This right of action accrues 
40 days after the completion, abandonment, 
or default in the performance of the work 
provided for in the contract. 
This bond shall be exhibited to any 
person interested, upon request. 
14-2-2 Failure to require Bond - Direct 
liability - Limitations of actions. 
Any person subject to the provisions of 
this chapter, who shall fail to obtain such 
good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit the 
same, as herein required, shall be 
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creates a lien against the improved property in favor of the 
contractors^ subcontractors, and materialmen.3 
(Footnote 2 continued) 
personally liable to all persons who have 
furnished materials or performed labor 
under the contract for the reasonable 
value of such materials furnished or labor 
performed, not exceeding, however, in any 
case the prices agreed upon. Actions to 
recover on such liability shall be 
commenced within one year from the last 
date the last materials were furnished or 
the labor performed. 
Section 14-2-1 was amended in 1987 and in 1989. 1987 Utah 
Laws 218; 1989 Utah Laws 271; see also Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1 
(Supp. 1990). 
3. The Mechanic's Lien Statute provides in relevant part: 
38-1-3 Those entitled to lien - What may be 
attached. .. 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all 
persons performing any services or 
furnishing or renting any materials or 
equipment used in the construction, 
alteration, or improvement of any building 
or structure or improvement to any premises 
in any manner and licensed architects and 
engineers and artisans who have furnished 
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, 
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or 
superintendence, or who have rendered other 
like professional service, or bestowed 
labor, shall have a lien upon the property 
upon or concerning which they have rendered 
service, performed labor, or furnished or 
rented materials or equipment for the value 
of the service rendered, labor performed, or 
materials or equipment furnished or rented 
by each respectively, whether at the 
instance of the owner or of any other person 
acting by his authority as agent, 
contractor, or otherwise. This lien shall 
attach only to such interest as the owner 
may have in the property. 
890017-rA 
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-When uncertainty exists as to the interpretation and 
application of a statute, it is appropriate to look to its 
purpose in the light of its background and history, and also to 
the effect it will have in practical application." Stanton 
Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 187, 341 P.2d 207, 
209 (1959). "[T]hese statutes should be interpreted and 
applied in such a manner as to carry out the purpose for which 
they were created: to protect those who supply labor and 
materials-" Kino Bros., Inc. v. Utah Drv Kiln Company, 21 Utah 
2d 43, 45, 440 P.2d 17, 18 (1968) (referring to Payment Bond 
Statute). See also Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 
P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982) (Mechanic's Lien Statute to be 
construed broadly to protect materialmen and laborers). 
The aim and purpose of our mechanic's 
lien law manifestly has been to protect, 
at all hazards, those who perform the 
labor and furnish the materials which 
enter into the construction of a building 
or other improvement. The result has been 
that the owner of the premises, at whose 
instance and for whose benefit the 
improvement is made, has been the one most 
likely to suffer loss. He pays at his 
peril the original contractor, who 
generally needs it and demands it as the 
work progresses. 
If he does not reserve enough of the fund 
in his own hands to pav for the labor of 
subcontractors and employees, and the 
price of materials, he incurs the risk of 
having to pav over again for at least a 
part of these items. 
. . . The bond, as in this case[,] is 
conditioned for the faithful performance 
of the contract and securing the payment 
of the laborers and materialmen. If the 
owner requires the contractor to procure 
the statutory bond/ he is protected 
against loss. If he does not, he becomes 
liable to laborers and materialmen if the 
contractor fails to pay them, even though 
he may have paid the contractor in full. 
He has his remedy in his own hands. 
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Rio Grande Lumber Co. v, Darke, 50 Utah 114, 122, 127, 167 P. 
241, 244, 246 (1917) (emphasis added). 
Even though the two statutes have similar language and 
similar purposes and have often been treated without 
differentiation, we will address the statutes separately in the 
interest of clarity. 
Inasmuch as the issues before us are limited to questions 
of law, namely, questions of statutory interpretation, no 
deference need be given the trial court's conclusions. Forbes 
v. St. Mark's Hospital. 754 P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988). We 
therefore review the trial court's statutory interpretations 
for correctness. Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 
P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
PAYMENT BOND STATUTE 
Wagner claims it was error for the trial court to conclude 
as a matter of law that the interior work done after assembly 
of the modular units did not constitute the "construction, 
addition to, alteration, or repair of any building, structure, 
or improvement upon land." 
The legal issue before us is whether the leasing of the 
modular buildings was outside the scope of the Payment Bond 
Statute because the buildings might be considered personalty 
rather than realty. We hold that, for purposes of the Payment 
Bond Statute, the modular buildings are to be regarded as 
realty as a matter of law, and that the leasing of modular 
buildings is therefore within the scope of the Payment Bond 
Statute. 
When stripped of its extraneous provisions, the plain 
language of section 14-2-1 of the Payment Bond Statute requires i 
that "[t]he owner of any interest in land entering into a 
contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the construction . . . 
of any building . . . obtain from the contractor a bond . . . 
•" Application of this plain language to the uncontroverted 
facts of the present case provides a ready result. 
Hercules entered into a contract with Modulaire to lease 
two modular office buildings. The lease agreement with 
Modulaire constituted a contract for the construction of a 
building involving $2,000 or more.4 Wagner provided 
i 
4. The lease arrangement entered into between Hercules and 
Modulaire constituted "a contract" for the construction of a 
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materials for the buildings which were built under Hercules1s 
lease agreement with Modulaire. Wagner did not receive payment 
from SBS for the materials. Hercules did not obtain a payment 
bond whereby Wagner could receive payment for the materials 
following SBS's failure to pay Wagner. Hercules is therefore 
personally liable to Wagner under section 14-2-2. See Kino 
(Footnote 4 continued) 
building. The parties stipulated at trial to the following 
contractual chain; -Hercules being at the top of a contract 
train, Modulaire being the second, Space Building Systems being 
third. . . . And then Grabber Utah, Plaintiff here involved in 
the chain." Hercules stipulation that it was in the contract 
chain for the construction of the complexes necessarily implies 
that its lease arrangement with Modulaire constituted a 
contract for the construction of a building. 
Even absent the parties' stipulation, the leasing 
arrangement constitutes a contract for the construction of a 
building on its own merits. The purchase order by which 
Hercules leased the complexes from Modulaire states: -These 
complexes will be built to Hercules specification no. 9106.-
(emphasis added). The purchase order also states -Installation 
to be complete as soon as possible. Hercules will be 
responsible for site preparation, sewer, water and electrical 
service hookups.- The purchase order also provided for one 
time charges for -delivery, set-up and skirting- of the 
complexes which were to be billed separately from the monthly 
lease payments. The construction contract between Modulaire 
and SBS similarly refers to Hercules as the -Owner- and 
Modulaire as the -Contractor.-
In any event and in view of the foregoing indicators that 
the lease was viewed by the parties as a contract for the 
construction of a building, we conclude as a matter of law that 
the leasing arrangement was such a contract. If a lessee 
enters into an agreement to lease a building which is not 
currently on its land but will be constructed by the lessor, 
the lessee is necessarily entering into a contract to construct 
the building upon its land or the land in which it has an 
interest. The construction of the building is necessary before 
the lease may become effective. By entering into the lease the 
lessor incurs an obvious contractual obligation to build the 
building. Inherent in such a lease is a contract for the 
construction of the building itself or else the lease agreement 
would be void and of no effect. 
890017-.CA * 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Bros., Inc.. 440 P.2d at 19 (shipment of materials to the job 
site and their consumption in the construction of a building 
was "a sufficient basis upon which to predicate liability for 
defendant's failure to obtain the bond.")* 
Despite the apparently clear applicability of the Payment 
Bond Statute, Hercules contends that the modular buildings did 
not become part of the realty as is required before the Payment 
Bond Statute may be applied. We recognize the general 
principle that the modular buildings must be regarded as realty 
before the Payment Bond Statute will apply. The issue 
therefore becomes whether these modular buildings are to be 
regarded as realty for purposes of the Payment Bond Statute. 
Physical Nature of The Modular Buildings 
Hercules seeks to avoid liability through application of 
the personal property "integration" test found in Paul Mueller 
Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 
1982). 5The trial court applied the Mueller test to 
determine whether the modular buildings had become integrated 
into the land and found that they had not. The trial court 
therefore concluded that the leasing of the modular office 
complexes did not constitute the construction of buildings. In 
effect, the trial court concluded that in order for a building 
to be a "building" under the Payment Bond Statute, it must be 
permanently anchored to the soil. There is, however, no such 
requirement. 
The test established in Mueller does not apply to the 
present case because the issue addressed in Mueller is not the 
issue before us. The Payment Bond Statute applies when work is 
done on, or materials are provided for, (1) any building, (2) 
any structure, or (3) any improvement upon land. Section 
14-2-1. Mueller dealt solely with the issue of whether whey 
drying equipment was an "improvement upon the land." The 
5. At issue in Mueller was whether whey drying equipment 
became part of the realty. The Utah Supreme Court considered 
the following three factors to determine whether the equipment 
had been sufficiently integrated into the realty so as to 
create a mechanic's lien: (1) the manner in which the 
equipment was attached or annexed to the realty; (2) whether 
the equipment was adaptable to the particular use of the 
realty; and (3) the intention of the annexor to make the 
equipment a permanent part of the realty. Mueller, 657 P.2d at 
1282. 
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present case, on the other hand, involves the construction of 
"buildings" which is a separate and distinct category. In 
other words, the Mueller test for determining whether personal 
property had become an improvement upon land does not resolve 
the present issue of what constitutes a building• 
If we were to adopt the Mueller test for what constitutes 
an improvement upon land as the test for what constitutes a 
building, we would effectively destroy the statutory "building" 
category. This we may not do because it would alter the 
materialman's burden of proof. "(T]he fact that the properties 
in question were buildings is of itself sufficient evidence 
that they were affixed to and became part of the realty. . . 
." Waldorf v. Elliott, 214 Or. 437, 330 P.2d 355, 357 (1958). 
If a materialman can prove that its materials were consumed in 
a building, that is all the statute requires. We refuse to 
impose the additional requirement that a materialman go further 
and also prove that the building is an improvement upon the 
land. 
Hercules fails to provide a single payment bond case 
requiring that a modular building be permanently anchored to 
the land. Hercules instead invokes the principle of in pari 
materia and relies upon mechanic's lien cases to establish a 
requirement that buildings be permanently anchored to the land 
before the Payment Bond Statute will apply. We are not 
persuaded. Our mechanic's lien cases, in fact, are either 
silent or support the opposite conclusion. 
The first mechanic's lien case cited by Hercules is Stanton 
Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 
(1959). In Stanton, subcontractors sought to foreclose 
mechanic's liens for the costs of transporting a drilling rig 
to the defendant's property and for tools used in the project. 
The Stanton court did not discuss whether a building must be 
permanently anchored to the land in order for a mechanic's lien 
to attach. In fact, the circumstances of the case support the 
opposite conclusion since a mechanic's lien was granted by the 
trial court for the labor expended in erecting the drilling 
rig, a temporary structure. 
The second mechanic's lien case offered by Hercules is 
Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 (1906). At 
issue in Eccles was whether the plaintiff had properly complied 
with the recording requirements of the lien statute. Again, 
whether a building must be permanently anchored to the soil was 
not discussed by the court. 
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A third mechanic's lien case that was not cited by 
Hercules, but that we find particularly persuasive on this 
issue is Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 P. 363, modified in 
part, 85 P. 1012 (1906). In Sanford, a mechanic's lien was 
granted for labor and material against a house that had been 
removed from the property upon which it was constructed and 
placed on another lot. The Utah Supreme Court held that the 
removal of the house did not destroy the lien on the land or on 
the house. We believe that if the actual removal of a building 
from the land will not defeat the attachment of a mechanic's 
lien to the building, then the mere intent to remove a 
building, as evidenced by the temporary manner in which the 
building is attached to the land, should not be permitted to 
defeat a lien, or, in this case, the Payment Bond Statute. 
"It is settled . . . that a building need not be physically 
anchored to the land to be considered realty. It may be found 
to be a fixture though it is secured to the realty by force of 
gravity alone." Rinaldi v. Goller, 48 Cal. 2d 276, 309 P.2d 
451, 453 (1957). 
There is no reason why one object should not 
be deemed a fixture merely because it is 
heavy and requires no attachment when a 
lighter object can be said to have passed 
the test of annexation because its lightness 
requires some sort of device to attach it to 
the realty. The method of attachment does, 
of course, in some cases conclusively 
establish the article as part of the 
realty. The method of attachment, however, 
does not ever conclusively establish that 
certain articles are not a part of the 
realty . . . ." 
Waldorf v. Elliott, 330 P.2d at 357 (prefabricated grain tanks 
of imposing size and weight that appeared to be permanent 
constituted buildings even though they were attached to land by 
gravity alone). 
The issue then becomes simply whether or not the modular 
office complexes are buildings. -What is a building must 
always be a question of degree; but ordinarily the word refers 
to a structure enclosing a space within walls and roof." 12 
C.J.S. Building (1980) (footnotes omitted). 
Hercules describes the office complexes as temporary 
trailers. This characterization is inaccurate. Hercules did 
not simply lease a few trailers to be used as portable offices; 
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it leased two "complexes" from Modulaire. Modulaire delivered 
thirty modular units measuring fourteen feet by sixty feet that 
were assembled together in a stationary fashion to create two 
buildings that together contained over 25,000 square feet of 
office space, complete with electricity/ plumbing, climate 
control systems, sidewalks and parking lots. 
The so-called "trailers" were nothing more than sections of 
a building that were transported to the building site upon 
their own wheels rather than upon a truck bed, a fact which is 
not controlling. See generally Thorp Finance Corp. v. Wright, 
16 Utah 2d 267, 399 P.2d 206 (1965). Nor is it controlling 
that the units are taxed as self-contained mobile homes. !£. 
399 P.2d at 208. It should also be noted that, according to 
the evidence submitted to the trial court, these units did not 
necessarily have four walls but were in fact designed to open 
into the neighboring units once assembled. We therefore 
conclude that these modular units could not be considered 
individual self-contained trailers. 
Hercules argues that since the buildings were modular and 
could be disassembled and removed from the site, they were not 
permanent. We consider the buildings sufficiently permanent 
because they were assembled in a stationary manner and because 
Hercules could, if it so desired, retain the buildings on the 
Navy's land indefinitely by exercising its option to extend the 
lease or its option to purchase the buildings. Hercules has, 
in fact, extended the lease several times and has indicated its 
intention to purchase the buildings. Hercules has built 
parking lots and sidewalks around these buildings, as if they 
were to remain permanently. We also note the considerable 
expense incurred by Hercules in locating these modular 
buildings on the site and the significant expense that Hercules 
would incur in removing the buildings. 
The fact that a stationary modular building is deliberately 
designed, assembled and installed in order to be disassembled 
and removed at some later date with relative ease does not 
prevent it from being a building. "Modern Authority . . . has 
minimized the importance of the method by which the article is 
attached or annexed to the realty." Waldorf v. Elliott. 330 
P.2d at 357. We "must acknowledge that prebuilt [buildings], 
mobile or otherwise, . . . are a part of our changing society, 
and give recognition to the fact that the law must be 
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responsive to the best interests of those whom it is designed 
to serve-w Heath v. Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 681-82, 604 P.2d 818, 
819-20 (1980). 
Legal Nature of the Modular Buildings 
Hercules also argues that the lease agreement with 
Modulaire prevented the buildings from becoming realty. The 
Utah Supreme Court has already addressed this argument in a 
similar fact situation and rejected it. Metals Manufacturing 
Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d 914 (1964). 
In Metals Manufacturing, the Bank of Commerce was the 
lessee of a building under a ten-year lease. A provision of 
the lease granted to the Bank the right to "make alterations, 
attach fixtures and erect additions, structures or signs" which 
were to remain the personal property of the Bank and which 
could be removed from the building by the Bank. The Bank, 
without obtaining a payment bond, contracted to have aluminum 
gates and railings installed, and paid the contractor for their 
installation. The contractor, however, did not pay the 
plaintiff who had supplied the gates and railings and the 
plaintiff sued for damages under the Payment Bond Statute. 
The Bank argued that the intention of the Lessor and Lessee 
that the fixtures remain personal property, as evidenced by the 
lease, prevented the installation of the railings from being 
-an addition, alteration or repair of any building, structure 
or improvement on land" because the owner of the building and 
land would not receive any permanent benefit from the 
modifications. 
The bank leans heavily on the principle 
that whether facilities such as these are 
part of the realty depends on the 
intentions of the parties. Generally this 
is true and binds the parties to the 
lease. However, it would seem to be 
unrealistic and unreasonable to conclude 
that such parties by agreement among 
themselves, could bind third party 
suppliers of materials to the terms of an 
agreement to which such suppliers were not 
privies and the terms of which they do not 
know. Such conclusion could result in 
easy circumvention of the statute whose 
purpose clearly is to protect suppliers, 
if what they supply falls within the clear 
import of the statute. 
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!£., 395 P.2d at 915. Sfifi also Kino Bros., Inc. 440 P.2d at 19 
(materialmen have "no practical way" of knowing details of 
arrangements between an owner of a building and others who have 
actual title to the ground). 
Hercules's assertion that a private agreement may prevent 
improvements from becoming realty for purposes of the Payment 
Bond Statute would effectively exclude from the scope of the 
statute all construction of, or improvements to, leased modular 
buildings. Under Hercules's approach, unsuspecting materialmen 
would be left unprotected for materials provided for leased 
modular buildings. The lessee of the modular building, 
however, would receive the direct benefit of such modifications 
without incurring any responsibility for payment. This result 
would be directly contrary to the purpose of the Payment Bond 
Statute. 
The purpose of the mechanics' and 
materialmen's lien statutes and likewise 
the [Payment Bond Statute] is to prevent 
the owners of land from having their lands 
improved with the materials and labor 
furnished and performed by third persons, 
and thus to enhance the value of such 
lands, without becoming personally 
responsible for the reasonable value of 
the materials and labor which enhance the 
value of those lands. 
Crane Co. v. Utah Motor Park, Inc.. 8 Utah 2d 413, 416, 335 
P.2d 837, 839 (1959). 
The fact that a lease was used as the contract whereby the 
buildings were constructed is of no consequence when it was 
Hercules who caused the buildings to be built, thereby causing 
the consumption of Wagner's materials, and it was Hercules's 
leasehold interests that were directly benefited by the 
materials. 
Summary as to Nature of The Buildings 
Although the modular buildings may constitute personal 
property as between Hercules and the Navy because they have not 
been permanently anchored to the land, and although the lease 
agreement may have caused the buildings to retain their 
personal property status as between Hercules and Modulaire, as 
between Hercules and its materialman, Wagner, we regard the 
buildings to be real property. 
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Our holding gives full effect to the purpose of the 
Payment Bond Statute which is that the risk of loss be borne by 
"the owner of the premises, at whose instance and for whose 
benefit the improvement [was] made." Rio Grande, 167 P. at 
244. By failing to obtain a payment bond, Hercules ignored its 
statutory duty to insure Wagner's payment and is therefore 
personally liable to Wagner. 
MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE 
Wagner also argues that it was error for the trial court 
to dismiss its mechanic's lien foreclosure action due to its 
conclusion of law that Hercules's interest in the real property 
was inalienable and therefore insufficient to be attached under 
the Mechanic's Lien Statute. The issue before us then is 
whether alienability is a precondition to the attachment of a 
mechanic's lien. We hold that there is no such precondition. 
The Mechanic's Lien Statute does not require that an 
owner's interest in real property be alienable before a 
mechanic's lien may attach. The only applicable precondition 
to the attachment of Wagner's mechanic's lien is that Wagner 
furnish "any materials . . . used in the construction 
. . . of any building." Section 38-1-3. 
An alienability test, as adopted by the trial court, would 
be impossible to administer because of the unique nature of 
each real estate transaction. There is a multitude of 
"interests" an "owner" may have in property that may be 
liened,6 each with its own unique degree of alienability. 
For example, a donated parcel of property may have a 
reversionary interest in the event the property is no longer 
used for the purpose for which it was donated. Similarly, a 
lease may be unassignable, or may require written landlord 
approval prior to assignment. The possible degrees of 
alienability are limited only by the ingenuity of the parties 
6. It is well established that the holder of an interest in 
realty which is less than fee title in the soil may be 
considered an owner for purposes of the Mechanic's Lien 
Statute. Kino Bros.. Inc., 440 P.2d at 19. A mechanic's lien 
may attach to a leasehold estate, e.g. Interiors Contracting, 
Inc., 648 P.2d at 1386, or an equitable interest pursuant to a 
real estate contract, e.g. Roberts v. Hansen, 25 Utah 2d 190, 
479 P.2d 345 (1971), or a building which has been removed from 
the land upon which it was constructed, Sanford 85 P. at 366. 
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involved. There is no clear line indicating that one degree of 
alienability would be sufficient and another would be 
insufficient. The unavoidable result would be confusion and 
arbitrariness in our mechanic's lien law. 
We believe that the question of alienability is adequately 
provided for in the language of the Mechanic's Lien Statute. 
Alienability is but one of the rights contained in the bundle 
of property rights which an owner may possess. A mechanic's 
lien attaches "to such interest as the owner may have in the 
property." Section 38-1-3. We interpret this phrase to allow 
attachment of a mechanic's lien to the entire bundle of 
property rights belonging to the owner, whatever it may 
contain, without any requirement that any particular right, 
such as unrestrained alienability, be present. 
If we were to exceed the plain language of the Mechanic's 
Lien Statute'and impose the additional requirement that the 
property interest of an owner be sufficiently alienable before 
a mechanic's lien could attach, we would create great 
uncertainty which would, in effect, shift the risk of loss to 
materialmen and laborers. Materialmen and laborers, who have 
"no practical way" of knowing the legal status of the property 
they improve, Kino Bros., Inc., 440 P.2d at 19, would not know 
in advance whether the property they are improving is tainted 
by a restraint on alienability. In such cases materialmen and 
laborers would bear the risk of loss, rather than the owner who 
has received the benefit. This is contrary to the clear goal 
of the Mechanic's Lien Statute which is that the property owner 
bear the risk of loss. See Rio Grande Lumber Co.. 167 P, at 
244. 
Ultimately, recognizing alienability as a precondition to 
the attachment of a mechanic's lien would destroy the 
Mechanic's Lien Statute. Owners could easily circumvent the 
Mechanic's Lien Statute by simply creating an inalienable 
interest in the land or in the building. We will not adopt a 
rule permitting such ready circumvention of the Mechanic's Lien 
Statute. Metals Manufacturing Co.. 395 P.2d at 915. 
We also conclude that our reasoning above, that a building 
need not be permanently anchored to the soil before the Payment 
Bond Statute will apply, is equally applicable to the 
Mechanic's Lien Statute. The Mechanic's Lien Statute provides 
in relevant part that "all persons . . . furnishing . . . any 
materials . . . used in the construction, alteration or 
improvement of any building, . . . shall have a lien upon the 
property upon . . . which they have . . . furnished . . . 
materials . . . ." Section 38-1-3. 
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Again, the Mueller test does not apply because the statute 
expressly refers to three types of modification to real 
property each carrying different tests. A mechanic's lien is 
expressly created for the value of materials supplied for the 
construction of a building. A materialman therefore only needs 
to prove that its materials were consumed in the construction 
of a building. The issue again becomes whether the modular 
office complexes constitute buildings for purposes of the 
Mechanic's Lien Statute. We conclude, for the same reasons 
stated above, that these sizable stationary modular complexes, 
complete with electricity, plumbing, climate control systems, 
sidewalks and parking lots, constitute buildings for purposes 
of the Mechanic's Lien Statute. The buildings are sufficiently 
permanent in that they may remain on the site indefinitely at 
Hercules's discretion. 
Wagner provided drywall materials that were consumed in 
finishing the interiors of the modular buildings. Wagner 
therefore has a lien against the improved property. The issue 
then becomes, to what property does the lien attach? Hercules 
claims that a mechanic's lien cannot attach because its 
interest in the land cannot be "sold judicially." To focus 
solely on Hercules's interest in the land, however, ignores 
other property interests belonging to Hercules to which a 
mechanic's lien might properly attach. 
In order to effectuate the purposes of the Mechanic's Lien 
Statute, the words "property," "realty," and "land" are to be 
broadly construed to include all property interests affected. 
The word "land" as used in the law, has 
since time immemorial been regarded as a 
generic term. It ". . . includes not only 
the soil, but everything attached to it, 
whether attached by the course of nature, 
as trees, herbage and water, or by the 
hand of man, as buildings, fixtures and 
fences." This is particularly true with 
respect to these lien statutes which 
should be liberally construed to 
effectuate their purpose. 
Kino Bros. , Inc., 440 P.2d at 19 (quoting 42 Am. Jur. Property, 
p. 196, and adding emphasis) (footnote omitted). 
Hercules has two separate and distinct property 
interests: (1) an equitable interest in the Navy's land 
pursuant to the award/contract; and (2) an equitable interest 
in the buildings pursuant to a leasing arrangement with 
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Modulaire. When combined, these two component interests 
constitute the property that was benefited by Wagner's 
materials. Wagner's lien attached to this cumulative property 
interest. We believe that in order to give full effect to the 
Mechanic's Lien Statute, Wagner may pursue the sale of the 
component property interests separately. 
[I]t has become quite generally recognized 
that at least in certain circumstances a 
mechanic's lien may attach to and be 
enforced against buildings or improvements 
alone. Thus a mechanic's lien upon 
improvements separately [sic] from the 
real estate has been upheld where the 
improvements and the land are not owned by 
the same party . . . or where the building 
constitutes a trade fixture and is thus 
not a part of the realty and is removable 
by the tenant or a licensee. 
53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics' Liens § 257 (1970) (footnotes 
omitted). 
In the present case, the buildings are owned by Modulaire 
and the land is owned by the Navy.7 Hercules brought these 
two separate ownerships together by virtue of its contract with 
the Navy and its lease with Modulaire. Where, as Hercules has 
argued, these buildings may easily be removed from the land 
without causing great injury to the land or the buildings, and 
where Hercules has shown that it has the right to remove the 
buildings, Hercules's component property interests may be sold 
separately at judicial sale. See Sanford, 85 P. at 367 (the 
7. Hercules argued on appeal that the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 270(a) et seq. (West 1986), which requires the procurement 
of performance and payment bonds on any public building or 
public work of the United States, applies to prevent a 
mechanic's lien from attaching to the Navy's land. This issue 
was raised for the first time on appeal and we need not address 
it. Heiner v. S.J, Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 115 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). However, in order to clarify the property 
interest being attached, we will point out that Wagner's lien 
attaches only to Hercules's interest in the land, whatever that 
might be, unless the improvements were made at "the instance 
o f the Navy. Interiors Contracting , Inc.. 648 P.2d at 1386. 
The Miller Act therefore does not prevent the attachment of the 
lien to Hercules's interest and may only apply if Wagner were 
to try to attach the Navy's interest in the land. Inasmuch as 
that issue is not before us, we do not speculate on how the 
Miller Act may apply in that circumstance. 
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supreme court directed the trial court to order the sale of the 
original lot first; if the proceeds were insufficient to 
satisfy the liens, the house was to be sold) modified in part, 
30 Utah 379, 85 P. 1012, 1013 (1906) (clarifying that the 
purchaser of the house at judicial sale would have the right to 
remove the house from its new location). 
CONCLUSION 
We find that the modular buildings, as a matter of law, 
constitute realty for purposes of the Payment Bond Statute. 
The trial court's determination that Hercules's leasing of the 
modular buildings did not constitute the construction of "any 
building" was therefore an erroneous conclusion of law. Based 
on the uncontested facts, we remand and instruct the trial 
court to find for Wagner and to determine the reasonable value 
of the materials furnished in accordance with section 14-2-2, 
Wagner's reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to section 14-2-3, 
and any other remedy to which Wagner may be entitled under the 
Payment Bond Statute. 
We also conclude that alienability of an owner's property 
interest is not a precondition to the attachment of a 
mechanic's lien. The trial court's dismissal of Wagner's 
foreclosure action based on the purported inalienability of 
Hercules's property interest in the land was therefore based on 
an erroneous conclusion of law. We find that the modular 
buildings, as a matter of law, constitute realty for purposes 
of the Mechanic's Lien Statute. The foreclosure action is 
therefore reinstated. 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. Costs and reasonable attorneys fees on 
appeal awarded to appellant Wagner pursuant to section 14-2-3. 
w»>#cc M a^. 'S 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Gregory"*, Or me, Judge 
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ADDENDUM C 
Utah Code Annotated S 14-2-1 et seg. (1986) 
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. 
The owner of any interest in land entering into a con-
tract, involving $2,000 or more, for the construction, addition 
to, alteration or repair of any building, structure, or improve-
ment upon land shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain 
from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract price, 
with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful 
performance of the contract and prompt payment for material fur-
nished, equipment and materials rented, and labor performed under 
the contract. This bond runs to the owner and to all other per-
sons as their interest may appear. Any person who has furnished 
or rented any equipment or materials, or performed labor for or 
upon any such building, structure, or improvement, for which pay-
ment has not been made, has a direct right of action against the 
sureties upon such bond for the reasonable value of the rented 
materials or equipment furnished, for the reasonable value of the 
materials furnished, or for labor performed, not exceeding the 
prices agreed upon. This right of action accrues 40 days after 
the completion, abandonment, or default in the performance of the 
work provided for in the contract. 
This bond shall be exhibited to any person interested, 
upon request. 
14-2-2. Failure to require bond - Direct liability - Limitation 
of actions. 
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, 
who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or to 
exhibit the same, as herein required, shall be personally liable 
to all persons who have furnished materials or performed labor 
under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials 
furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case 
the prices agreed upon. Actions to recover on such liability 
shall be commenced within one year from the last date the last 
materials were furnished or the labor performed. 
14-2-3. Action on bond to protect mechanics and materialmen -
Attorney's fee. 
In any action brought upon the bond provided for under 
this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court, which shall 
be taxed as costs in the action. 
14-2-4. Exceptions - Mortgagees, beneficiaries, trustees. 
Nothing in this chapter requires a mortgagee under a 
mortgage or a beneficiary or trustee under a deed of trust to 
obtain the bond described in S 14-2-1, or imposes any liability Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
upon a mortgagee, beneficiary, or trustee who has not obtained 
such a bond. 
Utah Code Annotated S 38-1-3 (1974 and Supp. 1986) 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien - What may be attached - Lien on 
ores mined. 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing 
any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment 
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any man-
ner; all persons who shall do work or furnish materials for the 
prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining 
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed 
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, 
plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, 
surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like pro-
fessional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the 
property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, 
performed labor or furnished or rented materials or equipment for 
the value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials 
or equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at 
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his 
authority as an agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall 
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the prop-
erty, but the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or 
deposit, whether working under bond or otherwise, shall for the 
purposes of this chapter include products mined and excavated 
while the same remain upon the premises included within the 
lease. 
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ADDENDUM D 
JAMES B. LEE (A1919) 
/JAMES M. ELEGANTE (A0968) 
'MARK S. WEBBER (A4940) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant Hercules, Inc 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
raa T/tj/ff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
JOHN WAGNER ASSOCIATES, 
d/b/a GRABBER UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HERCULES, INC., MODULAIRE 
INDUSTRIES, INC. and JOHN 
DOES I-X, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C86-404 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
* * * * * * * * 
Defendant Modulaire Industries1, Inc. ("Modulaire") 
Motion for Summary Judgment, in which defendant Hercules, Inc. 
("Hercules") joined, came on regularly for hearing before the 
Honorable Judge Frank G. Noel on Friday, August 14, 1987 at 10:00 
a.m. Plaintiff John Wagner Associates ("Wagner") was represented 
by Robert F. Babcock and Kurt Faux; Hercules was represented by 
James M. Elegante, and Modulaire was represented by Steven T. 
Waterman and Marco B. Kunz. 
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Hercules1 Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Judge Frank G. Noel on 
Friday, February 26, 1988 at 10:00 a.m. Wagner was represented 
by Darrell J. Bostwick and Hercules was represented by James M. 
Elegante. Modulaire did not appear nor was it represented. 
The Court having considered the pleadings and other 
papers on file herein, having heard the arguments of counsel and 
being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. This Order supercedes and replaces the Order 
signed by the Court on September 16, 1987 and entered that same 
day and supercedes and replaces the Order signed by the Court on 
September 24, 1987 and entered that same day. 
2« The Court finds that the interest of Hercules in 
the subject property is not alienable. Since the Court finds 
that the interest of Hercules is not alienable, the Court holds 
that said interest is not sufficient to be attached under the 
Utah mechanic's lien statutes, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1, et seq. 
Therefore, Wagner's First Claim for Relief as set forth in 
Wagner's Complaint, mechanic's lien foreclosure, is dismissed 
with prejudice. 
3. The Court finds that Hercules may be defined as an 
"Owner" under Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1(1)(b). However, the Court 
finds that there exist genuine issues of material fact which bear 
on the question of whether the improvements upon the 
-2-
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property are of the kind and nature which are covered by the Utah 
private construction bonding statutes, Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 et 
seq. Therefore, Hercules1 Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Hercules1 Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment concerning the 
Second Claim for Relief as set forth in Wagnerfs Complaint, 
failure to obtain a bond, is denied and the factual issues 
relating to the kind and nature of the improvements are reserved 
for trial. 
4. The Court finds that there exist genuine issues of 
material fact which bear on Wagner's Third Claim for Relief, 
joint check agreement, as set forth in Wagner's Complaint. 
Therefore, Hercules' Motion for Summary Judgment concerning 
Wagner's Third Claim for Relief is denied and the factual issues 
relating to the alleged joint check agreement are reserved for 
trial. A 
ENTERED this &(h day of March, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
$1 f/4*A //HA 
"i)ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to the 
following on this day of March, 1988: 
Robert F. Babcock 
Darrel J. Bostwick 
Walstad & Babcock 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
Steven T. Waterman 
Marco B. Kunz 
Watkiss & Campbell 
310 So. Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
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